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ABSTRACT
Post-ﬂood policies and compensation regimes tend to focus on the
resilience of public spaces and improving the adaptive capacity of
future private property developments. This article focuses on the
instruments associated with the resilience of existing privately
owned residential buildings from the perspective of post-ﬂood policies
and compensation regimes. By reviewing the relevant legal and policy
landscapes it aims to provide mutual lessons learned between the EU,
its member states and the US and to set forth generally applicable
recommendations for improving post-ﬂood policies for existing
buildings.
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Introduction
In both the European Union (EU) and the United States (US), ﬂood risk governance is an
urgent societal issue as more and more communities are likely to experience more frequent
extreme ﬂood events or sea level rise due in part to global climate change. For example, in the
US, the Houston, Texas, metropolitan area experienced three 500-year ﬂoods between 2015
and 2107 (Ingram, 2017). New research continues to expand the extent of urban areas which
will be inundated by sea level rise (Sanders, 2018). A variety of strategies, including ﬂood risk
prevention, protection, risk mitigation, preparation and recovery, may be used to address
ﬂooding (Driessen, Hegger, Bakker, Van Rijswick, & Kundzewicz, 2016; European Floods
Directive, 2007; Larrue, Hegger, & Trémorin, 2013). Flood risk prevention relates to eﬀorts to
keep people away from high-risk zones, and protection relates to keeping the water away
from the population, such as with dykes and dams (Driessen et al., 2016). Preparation aims to
inform the population about what to do in the event of a ﬂood. Most of the ﬂood risk
management literature focuses on the prevention of ﬂood events or the minimization of
property damage and the loss of human life when a ﬂood event occurs (Morrison,
Westbrook, & Nobel, 2018). The more limited post-ﬂood literature assumes that there are
two objectives: ‘returning to normal conditions as soon as possible and mitigating both the
social and economic impacts on the aﬀected population’ (CEC, 2004). Little attention has
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been given to the use of ﬂood recovery instruments to mitigate the costs of future ﬂood
events.
This article focusses on the rather neglected nexus between ﬂood mitigation and
recovery and argues that post-ﬂood recovery must be used both for humanitarian relief
and to plan and construct more resilient spaces. Examples of post-ﬂood measures
associated with the mitigation strategy are adaptive building requirements, resilient
reinstatement eﬀorts and green infrastructure, whereas the primemeasure of the recovery
strategy relates to ﬁnancially compensating people following the occurrence of a ﬂood
event, be it through public ex post compensation schemes or insurance mechanisms
(Suykens, Priest, Doorn-Hoekveld, Thuillier, & van Rijswick, 2016). Such schemes and
mechanisms within the recovery strategy can and should have an important positive
impact on strategies such as mitigation and prevention.
The analysis is guided by the research question, What are the legal and policy
requirements applicable to existing buildings after a ﬂood event has occurred in the
US and the EU, taking England and the Netherlands as examples? The following
structure guides our ﬁndings. We set the scene by shedding light on the institutional
DNA of the relevant countries and the EU. We then analyze the diﬀerences in ﬂood risk
management approaches in the US and the EU, the Netherlands and England. We then
delve into post-ﬂood policies speciﬁcally, and scrutinize the main key barriers in the
recovery–mitigation nexus for all countries studied. Finally, we oﬀer country-speciﬁc
recommendations and more general conclusions on resilient post-ﬂood policies.
The article takes a legal research approach; more speciﬁcally, it contains a legal compar-
ison. The comparison is a combination of dogmatic and functional approaches (Gorlé,
Bourgeois, & Bocken, 1991). The dogmatic aspects relate to the in-depth analysis of primary
and secondary legal sources (legislation of national governments, decentralized legislation,
guidance and policy documents, case law) and a comprehensive overview of the legal
system of the studied jurisdictions. The functional aspects regard the notion that a legal
institution should not be considered on its own, but only in relation to its function, more
speciﬁcally in relation to the society. The article therefore shows cases as illustrative
examples of good practices drawn from the diﬀerent jurisdictions (Dai, Wörner, & van
Rijswick, 2017; Groothuijse, Boeve, Broek, van Den, Keessen, & van Rijswick, 2018;
Kaufmann, Doorn-Hoekveld, Gilissen, & van Rijswick, 2016).
Setting the scene
Institutional DNA for multilevel ﬂood risk governance in the EU and the US
Before focusing on the speciﬁc ﬂood-related context, it is relevant to mention the
institutional diﬀerences between the EU and US and their respective relationship with
the states in question. The EU is a sui generis legal order whereby member states have a
distinct legal personality under international law. This is not the case for US federal
states. Moreover, federal institutions in the US have more extensive competences than
EU institutions, e.g., in terms of follow-up on implementation. Legislative acts issued at
the federal level in the US are directly binding upon the population, in contrast to the
EU (Hoornbeek, 2004; Kimber, 1995; Lavranos, 2006).
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Within the EU, the institutional DNA diﬀers signiﬁcantly between member states. This
is also the case for the Netherlands and the UK (England). The Netherlands is a decen-
tralized unitary state, with so-called functional decentralization. Speciﬁc responsibilities are
transferred from the central government to speciﬁc administrative bodies specially created
to fulﬁl these responsibilities (Burkens, Kummeling, Vermeulen, & Widdershoven, 2012):,
the regional water authorities (van Rijswick & Havekes, 2012). The Dutch constitution
obliges public authorities to keep the country habitable and to protect and improve the
environment. This generally formulated constitutional duty of care – upon which citizens
cannot rely directly before the courts – is further implemented in regular legislation in the
ﬁeld of planning, environmental and water law. The corresponding responsibilities are
divided among diﬀerent public authorities, including the regional water authorities
(Doorn-Hoekveld, 2017; van Rijswick & Havekes, 2012). Water management is highly
institutionalized in the Netherlands.
In the UK, the institutional set-up is very diﬀerent. Although legislation passed in
Parliament often governs the UK as a whole, a distinction is made in statute law
between diﬀerent regions of the UK. Flood risk management is one of these devolved
responsibilities, and therefore only England will be discussed here. English ﬂood risk
governance is complex, with many diﬀerent public, private and civil society actors
involved on national, sub-national and local scales. In contrast to the Dutch system,
England does not have a written constitution, and therefore governmental responsi-
bilities for ﬂood risk management are only deﬁned by legislation.
Diﬀerences in ﬂood risk management approaches
Mitigation-hampering legacies in the United States
In the US, the primary responsibility for preventing ﬂood and sea level rise damage rests
with the state and federal governments. There is no over-arching policy comparable to the
2007 Floods Directive. Instead, an unintegrated accumulation of policies and laws have
been adopted during the 200-plus years of ﬂood control policy.
The US has seen ﬂood policy evolve from riparian landowner responsibility to prevent
damage, to the construction of locally and state-funded levees, to the construction of
large, upstream multipurpose reservoirs (Shallat & Goetzman, 1994) and ﬁnally to the
downward devolution of responsibility back to the state and local governments (Chizewer
& Tarlock, 2013). Following the great Mississippi River ﬂood of 1927, the federal
government began to assume the primary responsibility for damage prevention and
later for post-disaster relief. However, federal dam and levee construction, which peaked
in the last quarter of the twentieth century, has left two legacies that hamper current
damage mitigation eﬀorts. The ﬁrst is the illusion that dams and levees can prevent all
ﬂood damage. In the early twentieth century, advances in hydrology contributed to the
comforting notion that historic ﬂood patterns would persist, and thus levees and dams
could prevent the worst damage. But they could not. This failure led to the second legacy,
moral hazard behaviour encouraged by the dams and levees, also referred to as the ‘levee
eﬀect’ (Di Baldassarre et al., 2018). The problem was ﬁrst recognized by the great
American geographer Gilbert White, who argued that levees and dams opened up
ﬂoodplains to more intensive development, and thus when ﬂoods came, damage would
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be increased; this insight has shaped thinking about ﬂood control in the US and elsewhere
(Macdonald, Chester, Sangster, Todd, & Hooke, 2011).
The federal government now oﬀers three basic kinds of post-ﬂood ﬁnancial and
humanitarian relief: subsidized federal ﬂood insurance for certain private residential
and commercial properties; assistance from the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) to administer a general federal disaster relief programme; and special
federal legislation for an area damaged by a major hurricane or ﬂood.
Risk-centred EU Floods Directive as the primary tool
At the EU level, the main legislative instrument for ﬂood risk governance is the 2007
Floods Directive. In contrast to the US, ﬂood insurance and compensation schemes in
the EU are administered by the respective member states. The Floods Directive adopts a
risk-based approach by focusing on dealing with the risks associated with ﬂoods, rather
than assuming that ﬂood events can be prevented altogether. Compensation for ﬂood
damage and how these mechanisms are sculpted is very much at the discretion of the
member state. No legislative framework for the recovery strategy exists; the Floods
Directive does not tackle it. The main instrument for ex post compensation at the EU
level is the EU Solidarity Fund, which channels funds to the states to compensate them
for damage to public infrastructure from ﬂood events on their territories. Besides ﬂood
risk governance regulations and direct funding from the EU to its member states, other
horizontal legislation is relevant. For example, the EU framework on state aid is
relevant, as support measures need to be reported in an oﬃcial notiﬁcation to the
commission. However, national support for damage from natural disasters is exempted
from these mandatory state aid notiﬁcation requirements under EU law.
Public responsibilities in the Netherlands
In the Netherlands, the responsibility for ﬂood risk management is concentrated in
public authorities, which is in line with the high institutionalization of water manage-
ment in general. After the disaster of 1953, when a large storm surge hit the Dutch coast
causing over 1800 casualties, a probability-reducing approach was adopted in line with
the maxim ‘never again’ (Kaufmann et al., 2016). With the high ﬂood risks in the
country, protection through hard ﬂood defence structures has historically been the most
dominant Dutch ﬂood risk management strategy (Doorn-Hoekveld, 2014; van Rijswick
& Havekes, 2012). Flood protection is the main responsibility of the central and
regional water authorities. Recently there is a visible shift from protection alone towards
a combination of protection and prevention through spatial planning (Doorn-
Hoekveld, 2017); see examples in Boxes 1 and 2.
A drawback of this institutionalized protective ﬂood risk management is the lack of
awareness of citizens of the ﬂuvial ﬂood risks they are facing. This is caused by little
responsibility being assigned to individual citizens. Only those living outside of dikes and
protection (at the river or seaside) have responsibility, which in practice even sometimes
goes beyond the legally binding ﬂood protection standards that the public authorities have
to guarantee. Another factor is that the need for ﬂood risk management has never been the
subject of public debate. Furthermore, there is a large amount of expertise on ﬂood
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protection. Finally, the high safety standards and limited governmental risk communica-
tion (Terpstra & Gutteling, 2008) are relevant in understanding the lack of awareness.
However, lack of awareness of ﬂood risks is remarkable in such a ﬂood-prone country. The
axiom that characterizes ﬂood risk governance in the Netherlands is that every inhabitant
pays taxes, and these taxes are used to keep the whole country safe, and this is done by the
state (Doorn-Hoekveld et al., 2016). In several surveys, ‘major ﬂooding in your area’ has
been the second-smallest worry regarding risks (Terpstra, 2009).
Private responsibilities in England
Responsibility for ﬂood risk governance in England primarily rests with the property owner
established through common law. Riparian owners have the right to protect their property
from ﬂooding as well as a legal duty to ensure that the use of their property does not
increase the risk of ﬂooding elsewhere (Environment Agency, 2012). Another key feature of
the English approach to ﬂood risk management is its comprehensiveness. A broad range of
strategies for managing ﬂood risk have been present for many decades, a reﬂection of the
susceptibility of England to ﬂooding from a number of diﬀerent sources.
A further key feature of ﬂood risk management in England is taking the opportunity
to learn lessons from ﬂooding events. Following ﬂooding there is often a period in
which the performance of existing strategies is examined and decisions analyzed (e.g.,
Box 1. Mitigation in the Noordwaard Project in the Netherlands.
An example of the combination of ﬂood protection with mitigation is the Noordwaard depoldering project. It
is one of the 34 projects of Room for the River. This overarching programme is intended to give rivers more
room to increase their drainage and storage capacity and, where possible, develop nature and recreation in
the area. The Noordwaard polder forms a new route for water of the Nieuwe Merwede canal in case of high
water discharges.
The project had far-reaching consequences for the residents and users (farmers) of the polder. Every resident
of the Noordwaard was oﬀered the chance to continue living in the area. To provide reasonable ﬂood risk,1
some of the houses needed to be rebuilt on terps or mounds. ‘Agricultural terps’ were also built, on which
farms are located and that form a safe haven for cattle as well. Evacuation routes were created for the
residents in case of high waters. A warning system was established, and regular evacuation drills are
conducted.2 All these mitigative measures were created by the competent authority and were ﬁnanced by the
state (Groothuijse et al., 2018).
Box 2. Mitigation in Project Zuidplaspolder.
Two types of ﬂoods demand two diﬀerent approaches in the Netherlands. Fluvial ﬂoods are the responsibility
of water authorities and are mainly dealt with in the protection strategy. For ﬂuvial ﬂoods, municipalities also
have responsibilities, laid down in legislation (the duty of care, as stated in Article 3.5 of the Dutch Water Act).
To prevent pluvial ﬂooding, private parties are more involved and mitigative measures exist as well. This is
visible in the Zuidplaspolder.
The Zuidplaspolder, located in the western part of the country, sits at 6.76 meters below sea level, one of the
lowest points of the country. Because of the pressure on the housing market in the urban agglomeration of
Western Holland (Randstad), the area is designated as a ‘development location’, despite the ﬂood risks. For
ﬂuvial ﬂood risks, the area depends on dykes (protection). For pluvial ﬂood risks for new urban development,
raised ﬂoor levels were advised by the regional water authority and incorporated in the spatial zoning plan of
the municipality.3 This is a form of private action, imposed by legislation, because developers must comply
with the rules of the municipal spatial zoning plan that imposes these ﬂoor levels (Kaufmann et al., 2016).
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Bye & Horner, 1998; Pitt, 2008; HM Government, 2016). This scrutiny oﬀers the
potential to inﬂuence ﬂood risk management moving forward and a wholescale change
and shift in approaches to managing risk, by reinforcing the need to be more resilient.
Post-ﬂood policies: exchanging experiences
Both at the EU level and in the member states investigated, post-ﬂood policies are
currently under heavy scrutiny. In the EU, the presumed lacuna in the legal framework
is under evaluation. In the Netherlands, debates have been going on in the past years to
analyze whether insurance coverage for ﬂuvial ﬂooding needs to be increased. The
English system has recently been subject to signiﬁcant changes. Lessons have been
learned in these three levels of governance from the best practices and the failures of the
existing regime in the US, and vice versa.
US: broken ﬂood insurance system
In the US, the National Flood Insurance Programme, induced by the cost of moral hazard
behaviour, dates from 1968. Federal ﬂood damage prevention and post-disaster relief laws
provide classic examples of tendencies of politicians to distribute resources rather than
compel costly behaviour changes. Inﬂuenced by White’s thinking, the legislation both
provides post-ﬂood insurance not available on the private market and requires commu-
nities to regulate development in areas prone to ﬂooding. The programme provides
reduced-rate ﬂood insurance to residents in high-risk areas only when local governments
enact zoning ordinances that discourage future development in these ﬂood-prone areas.
Community participation is voluntary. Under the programme, the federal government
provides reduced-rate ﬂood insurance to property located in a special ﬂood hazard area, a
100-year ﬂoodplain, in a participating community. Insurance is mandatory for all proper-
ties that apply for a federally backed mortgage.
The programme is widely considered to be broken (General Accounting Oﬃce,
2017). For example, after Hurricane Harvey in 2017, FEMA faced a USD 1.1 billion
shortfall in payouts and revenue, on top of the over USD 21 billion it has borrowed
from the US treasury over the years. Despite eﬀorts to use evolving technology, many
ﬂoodplain maps are out of date. FEMA is still using the 100-year ﬂoodplain paradigm
instead of mapping broader at-risk areas and accounting for climate change. Recent
legislative attempts to ﬁx the system did not succeed.
Multilevel governance issues impacting post-ﬂood policies
The Mississippi River ﬂood of 1927 led to a shift in ﬂood protection policy from levees
to dams and started a debate about whether disaster relief was a federal or state
responsibility. Congress enacted the ﬁrst federal disaster relief legislation in 1950. The
current general act, the Staﬀord Disaster Act, was passed in 1974 (Public Law 93–288
(1974), 43 USC § 5121 et seq.). The act requires disaster prevention planning which
provides a framework to help individuals who have lost their property or livelihood to
obtain temporary relief. The second option is a special act for the damaged area, which
can obtain a combination of grants and structural measures. The act is triggered by a
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state-of-emergency declaration by the president and provides a wide variety of disaster
relief to public facilities and private-property owners. Owners whose homes have been
damaged are eligible for temporary housing assistance and grants for the repair or
replacement of damaged structures (43 USC § 5174). However, if the damaged property
is in a mapped ﬂoodplain, FEMA may not waive federal ﬂood insurance requirements.
FEMA may also purchase or relocate damaged properties to open up ﬂoodplains.
For the most part, the use of land use control instruments to minimize ﬂood damage
rests with local governments, and they have traditionally used their land use control
authority to regulate new development in high-risk areas. The US Supreme Court,
however, has not been as receptive to refusing to compensate moral hazard behaviour
(Albrecht & Tarlock, 2018). Thus, despite the success of local governments in uphold-
ing ﬂood control regulations in state courts, the Supreme Court’s takings jurisprudence
holds out the hope that land use regulation to minimize ﬂood damage is potentially
subject to the challenge that it represents an unconstitutional expropriation (Chizewer
& Tarlock, 2016).
State building codes: cost-saving sticks
All states have adopted statewide building codes, and many require that new construction
minimize ﬂood and hurricane damage (see Boxes 3 and 4 for examples of regional/local
initiatives). They are often based on international codes, and these requirements for more
resilient structures have been very successful in minimizing water and wind damage.
However, they are not mandatory in all states (Insurance Institute for Business and
Home Safety, 2015). For example, Florida has a mandatory statewide hurricane code, but
Texas gives local governments the choice of whether to adopt its statewide code. And
unfortunately, in the current climate of climate change denial, several Gulf Coast states,
which experience frequent hurricanes, have weakened their codes.
Box 3. New Orleans: The Dutch Structural Solution with State and Local Rebuilding Standards.
Hurricane Katrina struck New Orleans and much of the Gulf of Mexico coast in late August 2004. Katrina was a
Category 5 hurricane (the highest category) when it passed over the warm gulf waters and diminished slightly
to a Category 3 storm (130–156 mph [209–251 km/h] versus 157-plus mph [252 km/h]) when it made landfall.
The federal government’s poor response to the devastation and social costs of Katrina, as well as New
Orleans’s iconic status as a tourist destination, led to a special recovery act. The federal Congress followed
Rotterdam’s example and authorized USD 14.5 billion for new, higher levees and ﬂood gates to close the ship
channel, the source of the devastating storm surge. However, a political decision was made to use a lower
standard than previously existed for ﬂood protection. In 1965, Congress mandated a system strong enough to
repel a storm consisting of ‘the most severe combination of meteorological conditions that are considered
reasonably characteristic of the region’ (Public Law 89–298 (1965)). However, after Katrina, the Corps was only
directed to raise levees ‘to provide the level of protection necessary to achieve the certiﬁcation required for a
100-year level of ﬂood protection in accordance with the national ﬂood insurance program under the base
ﬂood elevations current at the time of construction of the levee’ (Public Law 110–114, § 7012(a) (2007)).
The system has only bought time and must be supplemented by land use controls, because New Orleans is
sinking due to soil subsidence (Richard Campanella, ‘Humans Sunk New Orleans’, The Atlantic, 6 February 2018,
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/02/how-humans-sank-new-orleans/552323/), its barrier
coastal wetlands are disappearing, and bigger future storms are expected. The city has used FEMA funds to
ﬁnance the rebuilding of most new construction and post-Katrina elevation projects on open foundations,
consistent with international standards. Floodwaters ﬂood through an open ﬁrst/ground ﬂoor. In subsequent
ﬂoods, these buildings consistently had minimal, if any, damage compared to adjacent non-elevated
properties (Ingargiola & Ghori, 2015).
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Local government power to retroﬁt damaged buildings: thin sticks
More sophisticated ﬂoodmapping upgrades and the growing dissemination of the scientiﬁc
consensus about increased ﬂood risks with global climate change strengthen the case for
shifting some of costs of adaptation to private-property owners (Serkin, 2014). However,
local government’s power to require the modiﬁcation or removal of existing buildings
without compensation is limited because existing structures enjoy strong constitutional and
statutory protection from new local regulations. There is a major exception to this protec-
tion of the status quo that is increasingly being used after ﬂoods and hurricanes. If a
property is destroyed or substantially damaged by an act of God such as a ﬂood or
hurricane, most zoning ordinances only allow its rebuilding as a use that conforms to
current zoning regulations (Sams v. Dep’t of Envtl. Protection, 63 A.3d 953 (Conn. 2013)).
State law, however, may restrict municipal options to terminate non-conforming uses by
granting extra-constitutional protection to vested rights, thus encouraging inappropriate
rebuilding (Code of Virginia § 15.2–2307).
Post-ﬂood policies are lacking at the EU level
As mentioned, the EU Floods Directive does not include post-ﬂood policies. Its procedural
framework requires a three-step approach frommember states. Since its entry into force, the
directive has required member states to undertake preliminary ﬂood risk assessments, draw
ﬂood risk and hazard cartography, and submit ﬂood risk management plans to the EU
Commission. The directive does not include any substantive obligations, which means that
member states are in compliance if they fulﬁl their procedural requirements, e.g., submitting
the plans in a timely fashion (Priest et al., 2016). The signiﬁcant amount of discretion for
member states in the speciﬁc measures they adopt as part of their ﬂood risk governance
framework can be explained by the institutional diﬀerences, as well as the geographical
diﬀerences in aspects such as susceptibility to ﬂoods across the EU.
But the times they are a-changin’?
In recent years, there has been debate at the EU level as to how to move forward with
disaster insurance, in terms of both the best way to design these schemes and the degree
of harmonization that is desirable at the EU level. At the time of the ﬁrst wave of
evaluation in 2013, taking into account inter alia the regional diﬀerences between the
states in terms of types of ﬂood risks and the resulting economic losses, the European
Box 4. Cedar Rapids, Iowa: Opening a Floodplain through Buy-Outs.
Cedar Rapids is a small city in Iowa on a river that has seen repeated ﬂooding. There are no ﬂood retention
dams upstream (Linhart & Eash, 2010). After the highest recorded ﬂood, in 2008, the city developed what can
be described as a semi-Dutch ﬂood damage reduction approach. In brief, the city has hardened the protection
of the central business district but expanded the room for the river on the opposite bank. The city used
federal funds from FEMA and the Department of Housing and Urban Development to voluntarily acquire over
1000 properties to expand the existing ﬂoodway (Tate et al., 2016). In the journal Nature Climate Change, a trio
of Stanford researchers examined 27 recent cases of managed retreat aﬀecting 22 countries and 1.3 million
people. They found that, regardless of a country’s wealth and level of development, relocations are most likely
to happen when a government and its citizens are in accord.
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Parliament did not support a mandatory framework for compensation of natural
disasters steered from the EU level, but instead endorsed a ﬂexible insurance market
for natural disasters designed at the national level.
As is clear from the following analysis, Dutch and English post-ﬂood policies and
their respective approaches to the recovery strategy are related to all ﬂood risk manage-
ment strategies, and changing only the recovery strategy might aﬀect other strategies in
an unforeseen and unwanted way. The discrepancies between these approaches might
be too signiﬁcant to reconcile (Doorn-Hoekveld et al., 2016; Priest et al., 2016; Suykens
et al., 2016). As of now, the main incentivizing tool in the hands of the EU Commission
for inducing risk reduction measures through ﬁnancial schemes is the abovementioned
EU Solidarity Fund. This fund has been subject to heavy criticism, which led to a
reform in 2014. One of the elements of the reform relates to the ability to link
compensation of the member state in question to the measures taken by the member
state in question, with the EU Court of Justice empowered to determine failure to
comply with EU legislation on disaster risk prevention and management. The UK
received about €60 million for ﬂood events in January 2016; the impact of Brexit on
its future eligibility remains unclear.
Weak ad hoc public compensation scheme and marginal insurance coverage in
the Netherlands
The Netherlands has a governmental compensation scheme, the Calamities Compensation
Act. It is an entirely public system, funded by public resources. The act can come into force
after a natural disaster.When it does, a speciﬁcministerial regulation is written in which the
rights to compensation are laid down. The damage will not be fully compensated, and the
act contains many imponderables. It is not clear beforehand whether the act will come into
force after a ﬂood and if so, which damage will be compensated and inwhat amount. At this
moment the act has been used ﬁve times and compensated losses in the range of €1,115,647
to €147,209,966 (Veiligheid en Justitie, 2017).
No mandatory ﬂood insurance exists. Only one insurer oﬀers a ﬂood insurance, the
Neerlandse. Discussions have been held on insurance for secondary ﬂoods, i.e., ﬂuvial
ﬂoods caused by breaches of secondary ﬂood defence structures.
Currently, the system of compensation for ﬂood damage is plagued by uncertainties.
This is especially true for losses due to minor ﬂooding events that cannot be designated
as disasters and so will not be compensated by the governmental scheme.
Dominance of insurance scheme in England, and existing barriers
In England, very much in contrast to the Dutch situation, insurance and individual
responsibilities play a major role in ﬂood risk governance. One might therefore expect a
close relationship between ﬂood risk management and individual responsibilities and the
encouragement of those living with ﬂood risk to take action to reduce their risk. Although
there are some situations where this has occurred, there have been a number of intervening
factors. First, although there are no statutory duties for the government to provide ﬂood
management, the State has intervened for many years and has provided protection. This
intervention has in many cases established a disconnect between individual residents and
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their responsibilities for managing ﬂood risk. Although having only permissive powers, the
English government has consistently invested in ﬂood riskmanagement approaches (Defra,
2014, 2017) over many years, which has led to many expecting intervention. However, the
situation is changing. Many of the higher risks have received investment in England, so
cost–beneﬁt analyses for unprotected areas are becoming more diﬃcult to justify. The high
cost, coupled with the nature of ﬂooding, makes it diﬃcult to oﬀer protection, meaning that
it is not technically or economically feasible to oﬀer protection as a solution to ﬂood risk
management in all communities. As inmuch of Europe, ﬂood riskmanagement in England
has moved towards a greater emphasis on individual and community responses (Alexander
et al., 2016). This shift places increasing responsibility and pressure on at-risk communities
to manage their own risk, key actions being raising preparedness and adopting measures to
improve community resilience. The English context diﬀers from many other countries in
that for decades England has adopted a broad spectrum of approaches. In the recent
context, it has been recognized that government approaches should also aim to facilitate
local-scale approaches to resilience and look to opportunities to help individuals and
communities manage their own risk (Cabinet Oﬃce, 2011; Environment Agency, 2012).
A second barrier to individuals’ adopting post-recovery resilience has been the wide
availability and use of ﬂood insurance. Comprehensive ﬂood insurance has been
available since 1922 (Arnell, Clark, & Gurnell, 1984) and has relatively high penetration
(Association of British Insurers, 2017). In 2016, 72% of households had contents
insurance, and 61% had building insurance. Post-event recovery has been a key strategy
for many years and thus has been acting as a buﬀer for those aﬀected by ﬂooding and
oﬀered ﬁnancial assistance for recovery (Penning-Rowsell, Priest, & Johnson, 2014). As
such, insurance is a key factor in incentivizing and facilitating more resilient recovery.
Promising potential of the private insurance market
Greater potential can be found in the private market. Insurance provision is the key
measure whereby individual homeowners can be encouraged to adopt more resilient
approaches after a ﬂood and make their properties better adapted to resist or absorb
future ﬂood events. The adoption of individual risk reduction measures is in principle
beneﬁcial to all interested stakeholders. For property owners, the risk reducing beneﬁts
are clear and obvious, oﬀering less damage and disruption from future events and
protecting their assets. Similarly, for mortgage lenders the protection of the asset is
critical. For insurers, the adoption of individual property-level resilience measures will
reduce their overall exposure and make the coverage of that property more attractive.
From a government perspective, the use of these measures recognizes that property
owners are aware of the risk and are taking some individual responsibility for their risk,
and in turn increasing communities’ resilience to ﬂooding.
However, the use of these measures remains relatively low in comparison to the overall
number of properties at risk, with opportunities to inﬂuence the uptake of these measures
being curtailed by various factors in the context of a private market ﬂood insurance
approach. These factors include annual premiums, the Competition Act of 1998, scope
within the premium cost to provide a reduction, awareness by those insured that they are
at risk, an appreciation of those measures that can be taken to reduce risk, and unwill-
ingness of those insured to adopt measures. (For an example, see Box 5.) Following
WATER INTERNATIONAL 631
ﬂooding under standard insurance coverage agreements, private insurers are required to
provide recompense on a like-for-like basis. Insurers increasingly recognize that only
reinstating properties to their pre-ﬂood condition does nothing to reduce future risk.
There are informal guidance documents in place that demonstrate the willingness of the
insurance sector to encourage adaptive development. Moreover, the Association of
British Insurers and the government are producing a ﬂood risk report template for
homeowners to declare resilience measures to their insurance provider (although it is
not clear how such measures will be rewarded). However, in general the encouragement
of risk reduction measures is limited, as the process of ‘betterment’ would be more
expensive. The nature of annual premiums means that it is not in the interest of insurers
to spend more on recovery than they are contracted to, as the insured could switch to a
new insurer in the next year. Insurers are also prevented to a certain extent from working
together to agree to provide betterment by the Competition Act of 1998, which views this
type of collaboration as anti-competitive.
Some of these challenges, and in particular the ability of ﬂood insurance to better
incentivize resilient reinstatement and future adaptation, are key features, which may be
tackled in the future through the adoption of a new UK ﬂood insurance system, Flood
Re. Implemented in April 2016, Flood Re is a government-regulated but privately run
ﬂood insurance system which was introduced to ensure the continuation of universal
aﬀordable insurance in high-risk areas. For those in high-risk areas, it caps insurance
premiums (maintaining aﬀordability), which are then ceded by private insurers to
Flood Re. To cover any claims for these properties, a levy of c. £11 is applied to all
domestic ﬂood insurance premiums, which is put into an insurance pool (Flood Re,
2018). The Flood Re scheme is advocating an approach to encouraging risk reduction
measures either proactively or following a ﬂood event. Therefore, a key feature of Flood
Re is the production and update of a transition plan in which the premium cap will be
slowly raised, providing an incentive for policyholders to adopt risk reduction to reduce
the premiums they pay for insurance. The ﬁrst of these transition plans was released in
February 2016 (Flood Re, 2016), but formal incentive mechanisms to promote risk
reduction measures at the property scale are absent from the new Flood Re scheme, and
there is a lack of guidance on how to deal with repeated claims. Currently, there is no
requirement for insurers to inform property owners that they are at high risk and ceded
into the scheme, so some property owners may not realize they are at risk, although the
Box 5. Planning for Success: The Property Flood Resilience Action Plan (Defra, 2016).
In England, property-level resilience measures are increasing being recognized as important for improving the
ability of individual householders to manage their own risk and managing residual risk not cost-eﬀective to
manage with larger-scale ﬂood management approaches. However, despite considerable eﬀorts to encourage
broader adoption of these measures, including government pilots to demonstrate their use, uptake has been
modest. To address existing deﬁciencies a governmental roundtable was established and a ﬁve-year action
plan created. Five task groups focus on issues including removing the barriers to accessing funding and
piloting an advisory service; embedding resilience in the standard operating procedures of SMEs and insurers;
better sharing of information; establishment of consistent standards for resilience measures and the skills of
professionals (surveyors, builders) for implementing them; exploring diﬀerent options for communication; and
leading to behavioural change. The aim for the end of the ﬁve years is to standardize practices and normalize
the use of property-level measures in the portfolio of ﬂood risk management approaches.
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EU Floods Directive aims to raise awareness by prescribing ﬂood risk hazard maps that
should inform citizens of the risks they face. Also, the decision about whether it is cost-
eﬀective to adopt risk reduction measures (essentially, the cost of the risk reduction
measures against the beneﬁts of premium reduction) is a complex one, particularly
when insurers are themselves not clear on what premium reductions might be oﬀered.
In the consultation documents, the government stated an expectation for Flood Re to
‘set out clear proposals on how it will create incentives for policyholders to take
ownership and invest in resilience measures, including through all appropriate ﬁnancial
incentives’ but this is currently lacking.
Grant schemes that hold potential in England
The UK government does not in principle oﬀer many forms of compensation, but
following ﬂooding it has used a number of diﬀerent ad hoc approaches which oﬀer
diﬀerent types of ﬁnancial and other assistance or support to diﬀerent groups of those
aﬀected. A key governmental approach which has helped homeowners, and which
tackles the issue of betterment, is the introduction of the Property Level Flood
Resilience Grant Scheme (previously known as Repair and Renew Grants). This aims
to encourage movement away from standard reinstatement techniques and a ‘return to
normal’ discourse. Property owners may apply to their local authority (although the
scheme is ultimately funded by central government) for a grant of up to £5000 to fund
additional ﬂood resilience and resistance measures for their property. For the most part,
the funds will be paid by the insurance company, the speciﬁc aim of these grants being
to enable resilient reinstatement and to bridge the gap between returning a property to
its pre-ﬂood state and adaptation measures for the future (DCLG/Defra, 2016).
In principle, these grants should increase the resilience of properties that have been
aﬀected by ﬂooding, but how they have been implemented may limit their eﬀectiveness.
Conclusions
We have engaged with the literature on ﬂood risk management, the bulk of which
focuses on preventing ﬂood events and limiting property damage and the loss of human
life (Morrison et al., 2018; Surminski, 2018). We have delved into the nexus between
recovery and mitigation strategies and scrutinized how measures related to the mitiga-
tion strategy are addressed in post-ﬂood policies and mechanisms. In line with the UN’s
International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, nations need a ﬂood policy that links risk
prevention and mitigation and post-ﬂood compensation (Bubeck, Botzen, Kreibich, &
Aerts, 2013; Surminski, 2018). The emphasis must be on the promotion of property
redevelopment and land use choices, such as retreat or limited development, that
reduce the risks of future damage. However, our research has shown, in line with the
international literature referred to throughout the article, that the link between mea-
sures related to the recovery strategy (e.g. ﬁnancial compensation) on the one hand and
the prevention strategy and mitigation strategy on the other hand (e.g. keeping people
away from the water or oﬀering incentives to ﬂood-proof their houses) are ineﬀective or
lacking.
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The nations considered here have very diﬀerent post-ﬂood policy set-ups and
approaches to the compensation of properties damaged by a ﬂood. Post-ﬂood compen-
sation plays a major role in the US, an important but more limited role in England, a
very limited role at the EU level and an even more limited role in the Netherlands. The
reasons for the limited impact of EU ﬂood regulations on post-ﬂood compensation in
its member states are twofold. First, the emphasis of the EU Floods Directive is on risk-
based prevention. Second, the directive does not have a substantive impact on the scope
and content of member states’ ﬂood risk governance measures, as its nature is entirely
procedural (Herman, 2010). Post-ﬂood compensation schemes in EU member states are
impacted somewhat through various EU policies beyond the Floods Directive, e.g., the
Solidarity Fund and ﬁnancial regulations set forth at EU level related to, for example,
state aid.
In general, the main instruments of post-ﬂood relief are ﬂood insurance and
government payments. In the US and England, both serve two purposes. The ﬁrst is
humanitarian: victims should be restored to the status quo. The second links post-ﬂood
compensation to ﬂood damage prevention and uses compensation as a way to promote
more resilient building construction and land use. The two objectives often conﬂict; the
human drive for real estate development by industry, property owners and local
governments has outweighed resilience objectives and related costs. As sea level rise
and inland ﬂooding become more frequent due to global climate change, the pressure
for post-ﬂood compensation will increase.
The legal and policy frameworks analyzed in this article are mutually inspiring, laying
the groundwork for future research, notwithstanding the importance of context speciﬁ-
city and avoiding transplants. As post-ﬂood compensation in the Netherlands is in its
infancy, a closer look at the drawbacks and positive experiences of the elaborate scheme
applicable in the US can be beneﬁcial. Likewise, existing instruments such as the resilient
reinstatement grants issued after ﬂoodings, as in England, are straightforward and
versatile in promoting the link between risk prevention and mitigation and post-ﬂood
compensation. However, these grants have been unsuccessful in the past – the underlying
cause of this problem is useful for other nations.
In the US, despite the lack of a coherent national ﬂood and climate change policy, local
governments are taking important steps to link post-ﬂood recovery eﬀorts with ﬂood
management strategies which will minimize future ﬂood damage. These eﬀorts would
beneﬁt from uniform federal ﬂood management guidelines and grant programmes that
reward innovative local programmes which seek to reduce moral hazard behaviour.
In the Netherlands, the strong emphasis on ﬂood protection has proven to be
eﬀective in general. However, such a strong role for the government might not ﬁt
with the DNA of other countries. The sophisticated Dutch legal framework, with its
standards, policy instruments that provide for easy implementation of ﬂood protection
measures, and a strong long-term planning approach, as well as investments in knowl-
edge, innovative approaches and in recent years incorporating nature-based solutions,
may serve as an example, especially for those countries that are vulnerable to the eﬀects
of climate change. However, moral hazard behaviour, including the levee eﬀect, exists,
as sometimes other values and interests prevail over ﬂood protection. More attention
should be paid to ex post recovery systems and increasing awareness. Individual ﬂood
protection is almost impossible due to the physical circumstances in the Netherlands.
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However, the idea of stricter – more ﬂood-proof and resilient – building requirements
in general, and especially when rebuilding after a ﬂood, is inspiring. Regulating this is
feasible in the Dutch system, as it will not be regarded as expropriation of property
rights, as it would in the US. Introduction of an insurance scheme might raise aware-
ness but should not hamper the current focus on prevention, as this would make the
country as a whole less habitable, as the risks might rise to an unacceptable level. Also,
legally binding safety standards that oblige the government to guarantee a high level of
protection and which in the near future might be qualiﬁed as obligations of result will
inﬂuence any insurance system. In the possible evolution towards a more elaborate
insurance scheme, premiums should be diﬀerentiated to stimulate prevention and
mitigation measures by citizens.
In England, the strong reliance on insurance has had some positive impacts in terms of
mitigation, but also drawbacks. There is high potential there, but realizing and incentivizing it
is challenging and time-consuming. Recognizing the role of a public–private partnership
between government and insurers is something that might be further developed in the other
countries. The grants for resilient reinstatement following ﬂooding (i.e., bridging the insur-
ance gap), although in their infancy, can provide a goodmodel for elsewhere – although these
have their own challenges.
In both the Dutch and the English systems, building regulations should be improved
so that properties are less likely to become damaged in the ﬁrst place. In England, the
greatest opportunities at this time are in the private market, which avoids government
regulation when it can. Paramount is a smooth transition to diﬀerentiated, i.e., risk-
reﬂective pricing, through a much stronger tie between insurance premium pay-outs
and resilient reinstatement. But there currently are many barriers in relation to infor-
mation provision and clarity about the transition approach. Furthermore, more tech-
nical evidence is required to demonstrate the eﬀectiveness of resilience measures –
providing conﬁdence to property owners (that it is worth their investment), insurers
(that it is worth a premium reduction) and government (that money is provided as a
grant – that it is an eﬃcient use of public funds).
Having looked at the Dutch and English post-ﬂood legal and policy landscape, it is clear
that a harmonization imposed by the EU in this area is not feasible in the foreseeable future.
However, post-ﬂood measures could be integrated into the procedural framework of the
Floods Directive, and more speciﬁcally the ﬂood risk management plans. The lack of
reference to post-ﬂood policies in the Floods Directive and its implementation hampers
resilient ﬂood risk management, as linking ﬂood risk management strategies is an impor-
tant condition of achieving such resilience (Driessen et al., 2016; Gilissen, Alexander,
Matczak, Pettersson, & Bruzzone, 2016).
Finally, enhancing the synergies between public and private actors involved in
ﬂood risk governance is important in both the EU and the US. Indeed, linkages
between ﬂood risk management strategies are often hampered by issues such as a
lack of up-to-date risk cartography, which could be remediated through improved
public–private partnerships. Future research could further ﬂesh out and compare
speciﬁc instruments in the post-ﬂood policies realm. Furthermore, research could
focus on such public–private partnerships and how these could be used to further
post-ﬂood policies, in both a public ex post compensation setting and an insurance-
centred policy landscape.
WATER INTERNATIONAL 635
Notes
1. The houses and their foundations needed to be able to withstand a ﬂood that could occur
once every 25 years.
2. Website of 'Ruimte voor de Rivier', https://www.ruimtevoorderivier.nl/english/ (visited 9
April 2018).
3. Spatial Zoning Plan Westergouwe B01034.513000 (GU0001), August 2008.
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